Wednesday, February 16, 2005
Does the United States Know How to Balance Power?
While reading Richard Holbrooke's monthly column in the Washington Post ("The End of the Romance"), I was struck by an awful realization: the United States has never played the peacetime diplomatic game known as The Balance of Power with more than two players, and, as such, we are completely unprepared for how to conduct our foreign policy in today's multi-polar world.
Before World War I, the United States stood behind the Monroe Doctrine and maintained a disengagement from the affairs of Europe. Therefore the best model for the current state of world affairs (pre-WWI Europe) is known to U.S. policymakers and the American consciousness only through history and myth. We have no national, collective memory of that experience, nor are there principles and examples to be followed.
(When I compare the world today to pre-WWI Europe, I am mainly refering to multiple regions or countries with competing interests. I identify the U.S., the EU, Russia, China, and India as the five dominant powers. Strangely, the Middle East holds the same potential power as a pre-unification Germany possessed in the 19th century. If an economic union ever took hold and progressed toward defense agreements, the resulting regional dynamics would almost certainly lead to conflict on all sides).
After WWI, the United States entered the world stage for a brief moment, at Versailles, and Wilsonian ideals (strikingly similar to Bush the Younger's ideals) made a claim for world influence. Faced with the prospect of engaging with the wider world through the League of Nations on Europe's balance of power terms, the United States returned to isolation for the next two decades.
After WWII, the United States faced the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the two behemoths traded jabs and feints for the next 45 years in the Cold War. Other powers, though recognized, were used as pawns or at best semi-feudal partners during the conflict.
When the Soviet Union collapsed, the United States had a chance to return to the American tradition of isolation, but remained on the world stage, unsure of itself at times, boldly confident at others. Globalization promised the end of history, but religious and civil conflicts continued to warn of an eternal curse over humanity's chances for peace.
The biggest change over the last 15 years, however, other than the United States' return to Wilson through Bush, is that the other world powers have begun to adjust and adapt to the changing circumstances. China grows in power and dominance daily, with unknown consequences for the Asian rim and U.S. control of the Pacific. The EU engages in Middle Eastern diplomacy while participating in trade wars with the U.S. Russia bullies its neighbors while alternating between ally and irritant (opposition to the invasion of Iraq). India's poverty may hold it back from being a world-class power, but China's poverty led to its industrialization, which could provide a model for India.
(Note: North Korea's war-mongering could trigger a re-armament of Japan, which would introduce drastically different circumstances, including Japan's re-entry as a Great Power and a potentially deadly future confrontation with China. In fact, China's eventual military strength may prompt Japan to consider its own defenses without reliance on American support, especially since few in the U.S. consider China to be a geo-political threat.)
Still, the world revolves around the Middle East. Its weakness invites incursion, with unknown consequences. Napoleon's nationalistic armies marched across Europe, but while they returned to France the nationalism remained. What will we leave in Iraq?
The EU's ambivalence toward Turkey could cause that country to turn to Russia or toward fellow Muslim states: Pakistan, Iran, Egypt, Saudia Arabia, or Iraq. Pakistan may decide it needs allies against India. If the Central Asian nations resist Russian (or Chinese) encroachment, will the Muslim nations to the south answer a call for help? A Middle Eastern economic free-trade zone would mean that the leaders of the Middle East know that they have more to fear from outsiders than from each other.
Yet few in this country understand the need to play a multi-player game of balance of power. Idealists still wax eloquent about globalization's promises and the future of worldwide cooperation and trade. Rather than maturely playing powers off each other and eliminating disagreements with natural allies (the EU, India, Japan?), the U.S. coddles Russia and China and sows discontent and distrust in the Middle East. We seek to eliminate small and medium-sized tyrannies, while ignoring the elephants in the corners.
I would encourage the reader to begin to view the world through a different lens: that of pre-WWI Europe. Multiple powers, shifting alliances, and an understanding of the need for economic as well as military superiority are all present. The American voting public, especially, needs to understand the need to think strategically, not idealistically, about the world and about our place in it. The 1990s are gone, and it's about time we started acting like it.
Before World War I, the United States stood behind the Monroe Doctrine and maintained a disengagement from the affairs of Europe. Therefore the best model for the current state of world affairs (pre-WWI Europe) is known to U.S. policymakers and the American consciousness only through history and myth. We have no national, collective memory of that experience, nor are there principles and examples to be followed.
(When I compare the world today to pre-WWI Europe, I am mainly refering to multiple regions or countries with competing interests. I identify the U.S., the EU, Russia, China, and India as the five dominant powers. Strangely, the Middle East holds the same potential power as a pre-unification Germany possessed in the 19th century. If an economic union ever took hold and progressed toward defense agreements, the resulting regional dynamics would almost certainly lead to conflict on all sides).
After WWI, the United States entered the world stage for a brief moment, at Versailles, and Wilsonian ideals (strikingly similar to Bush the Younger's ideals) made a claim for world influence. Faced with the prospect of engaging with the wider world through the League of Nations on Europe's balance of power terms, the United States returned to isolation for the next two decades.
After WWII, the United States faced the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the two behemoths traded jabs and feints for the next 45 years in the Cold War. Other powers, though recognized, were used as pawns or at best semi-feudal partners during the conflict.
When the Soviet Union collapsed, the United States had a chance to return to the American tradition of isolation, but remained on the world stage, unsure of itself at times, boldly confident at others. Globalization promised the end of history, but religious and civil conflicts continued to warn of an eternal curse over humanity's chances for peace.
The biggest change over the last 15 years, however, other than the United States' return to Wilson through Bush, is that the other world powers have begun to adjust and adapt to the changing circumstances. China grows in power and dominance daily, with unknown consequences for the Asian rim and U.S. control of the Pacific. The EU engages in Middle Eastern diplomacy while participating in trade wars with the U.S. Russia bullies its neighbors while alternating between ally and irritant (opposition to the invasion of Iraq). India's poverty may hold it back from being a world-class power, but China's poverty led to its industrialization, which could provide a model for India.
(Note: North Korea's war-mongering could trigger a re-armament of Japan, which would introduce drastically different circumstances, including Japan's re-entry as a Great Power and a potentially deadly future confrontation with China. In fact, China's eventual military strength may prompt Japan to consider its own defenses without reliance on American support, especially since few in the U.S. consider China to be a geo-political threat.)
Still, the world revolves around the Middle East. Its weakness invites incursion, with unknown consequences. Napoleon's nationalistic armies marched across Europe, but while they returned to France the nationalism remained. What will we leave in Iraq?
The EU's ambivalence toward Turkey could cause that country to turn to Russia or toward fellow Muslim states: Pakistan, Iran, Egypt, Saudia Arabia, or Iraq. Pakistan may decide it needs allies against India. If the Central Asian nations resist Russian (or Chinese) encroachment, will the Muslim nations to the south answer a call for help? A Middle Eastern economic free-trade zone would mean that the leaders of the Middle East know that they have more to fear from outsiders than from each other.
Yet few in this country understand the need to play a multi-player game of balance of power. Idealists still wax eloquent about globalization's promises and the future of worldwide cooperation and trade. Rather than maturely playing powers off each other and eliminating disagreements with natural allies (the EU, India, Japan?), the U.S. coddles Russia and China and sows discontent and distrust in the Middle East. We seek to eliminate small and medium-sized tyrannies, while ignoring the elephants in the corners.
I would encourage the reader to begin to view the world through a different lens: that of pre-WWI Europe. Multiple powers, shifting alliances, and an understanding of the need for economic as well as military superiority are all present. The American voting public, especially, needs to understand the need to think strategically, not idealistically, about the world and about our place in it. The 1990s are gone, and it's about time we started acting like it.
